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Abstract 
This article introduces non-Western policy sciences into the burgeoning field of the 
intellectual history of Earth system governmentality, a field that studies the ideas, institutions 
and material systems that enable action at the global scale. It outlines the rise of debates on 
the idea of the governability of the global biosphere in late Soviet Russia (1970s-1980s), 
focusing particularly on the extension of Vladimir Vernadskii’s famous theory of the 
biosphere and its governance (the stage of the noosphere) into computer modeling and 
systems analysis. As a result, a new notion of governance as guidance through milieu arose to 
conceptualize global governance of the biosphere. This conceptual innovation was part of 
Soviet scientists attempt to liberalize the centrally commanded Soviet governmental system.  
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Recent work has established a new research agenda in the field of “Earth system 
governmentality,” an interdisciplinary area of study that combines the perspectives of 
environmental history, international organization and studies of science and technology to 
investigate the social and political consequences of the emerging role of mankind as a 
geological force.
1
 However, the bulk of this work has focused on developments in the West, 
despite the fact that Earth system governance was by nature a global movement. This article 
seeks to augment our understanding of the emergence of Earth system governmentality by 
exploring the subject from the Soviet perspective. It argues that not only were developments 
in the Soviet Union vital to the emergence of the concept, but that the process of developing 
concepts of Earth system governance drove a fundamental revision of authoritarian dogmas 
of governability and concepts of man’s relationship with nature. Through this process, the 
Soviet version of Earth system governmentality contributed to the development of a “liberal” 
model of negative governance, which emphasized the limits to intervention rather than policy 
and management targets to be achieved, an intellectual innovation that was rooted in the 
advancement of computer modelling technology and East-West intellectual transfer.  
It is centrally important to include the Soviet case in the intellectual history of Earth 
system governance, not least because Paul Crutzen, the originator of the concept of the 
Anthropocene, attributed its intellectual origins to Russian theories of the biosphere and 
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and Politics,” Progress in Human Geography (2016), 1-30. For antecedents of the Anthropocene 
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noosphere.
2
 The origin of the concept of the biosphere, designating the Earth’s layer that is 
characterized by living matter, dates to the second half of the nineteenth century. Conversely, 
its sibling concept, the noosphere, was developed by the Russian geologist and natural 
scientist Vladimir Vernadskii (1863-1945) and French philosophers Pierre Teilhard de 
Chardin and Edouard Le Roy, whom Vernadskii met in Paris in 1922-1925.
3
 Vernadskii’s 
book The Biosphere (published in Russia in 1926, first translated into English only in 1986) 
posited that living matter was shaped through the interaction of solar energy and bio-
geophysical processes. While Teilhard de Chardin coined the concept of the noosphere to 
describe the ultimate stage of human progress, where cosmos, god, reason and the material 
world would unite, Vernadskii saw the noosphere as a stage of the development of living 
matter, the biosphere, where humankind becomes a geological force and human reason 
(razum in Russian) acquires power to drive the change.
4
 A noosphere is therefore a particular 
stage of biospheric development, where global coevolution becomes governable.
5
  
                                                          
2 Paul Crutzen, “Geology of Mankind,” Nature, 415/3 (2002), 23. 
3
 Will Steffen, et al., “Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing Planet,” 
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5
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Vernadskii’s legacy significantly shaped Soviet thought on global governance during 
the Cold War as his geophysical philosophy was extended beyond the natural sciences into 
the new field of decision and policy sciences, characterized by operations research (OR), 
economic and management cybernetics and systems analysis.
6
 While there is a growing 
Anglo-American historiography on the Soviet version of Cold War policy sciences, including 
their environmental applications, this is the first account of the rapprochement between 
Soviet policy sciences and western Earth system governance.
7
 The purpose is to add a global 
governance dimension to the well-established work on environmental politics in the Soviet 
Union.
8
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The empirical focus is on the prominent Soviet Russian scientist Nikita Moiseev 
(1917-2000), who transformed Vernadskii’s geophysical philosophy into an applied policy 
science, entrenched in the global concerns of the Cold War. For Moiseev, to govern the 
global biosphere required the invention of new policy sciences, which would enable 
humanity to step into the stage of the noosphere. It is difficult to overstate Moiseev’s 
intellectual and political significance for the opening up of Soviet science to international 
cooperation. Moiseev was a patron of global computer modelling in the Soviet Union, and in 
the early 1980s he cooperated with Crutzen on the famous nuclear winter study, a computer 
simulation of the environmental effects of nuclear war. While the legacy of the nuclear winter 
study can certainly be seen in Crutzen’s formulation of the Anthropocene theory, Moiseev 
used the nuclear winter simulation to argue that the idea of governing the global biosphere 
was not a utopia, but a challenge for policy science. Furthermore, Moiseev was also a high 
level policy advisor: he informally advised Mikhail Gorbachev when the latter was the 
chairman of the Stavropol region and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU).
9
 The extent of Moiseev’s contribution to Gorbachev’s domestic and 
foreign policy will not be clear until archival materials become available in the future. 
However, Moiseev’s role in the promotion of new technologies alongside new normative 
epistemologies is fairly evident: in addition to global climate modelling, Moiseev initiated the 
development of a computerized decision-making model for agricultural development in the 
Stavropol region, a project which was implemented in cooperation with the International 
Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria.
10
 Moiseev was also 
                                                          
9 This is based on Moiseev’s contemporaries’ memoirs; a study of archival materials is necessary in 
order to establish the concrete forms of Gorbachev’s and Moiseev’s relation. Aleksandr A. Petrov, 
Nikita Nikolaevich Moiseev: Sud’ba strany v sud’be uchenogo (Moscow, 2011), 106-7.  
10 Petrov, 107-109. This agricultural decision-making model was developed by F. Ereshko, V.Y. 
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central to the introduction of “global problems” as a priority area in the CPSU’s long-term 
plan in 1986, i.e. global issues such as carbon dioxide emissions, world population growth 
and world energy resources, which cannot be resolved by a single state. Furthermore, 
Moiseev had a wide societal impact as a prolific popularizer of science: his books were 
published in runs of thousands of copies and were widely read in society and by managerial 
elites in the 1980s. Since his death in 2000, the intellectual legacy of Moiseev has been 
fostered by institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences and leading university 
departments.
11
  
Fascinating as it is in its own right, this Soviet extension of Vernadskii’s theory of the 
biosphere and noosphere to actual environmental governance is also relevant for the 
comparative intellectual history of global modelling. However, this case has even broader 
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Moiseev’s work to rethink Russia’s development: Elena Glushenkova, Ekopolitologiia N. N. Moiseeva 
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Moiseev’s birth were convened by the Moscow State University (2007) and the Trapeznikov Institute 
of Control Problems at the Russian Academy of Sciences (2017), not to count the many events 
organized by the International Independent Ecological-Political University in Moscow, that was co-
founded by Moiseev and Nikolai Reimers in 1992. 
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significance, because it offers important insights into a conceptual shift in the understanding 
of what it means to govern in both East and West. This shift, as explicated by Moiseev, took 
place as a reorientation from the cybernetic theory of predictive control to governance as 
guidance through milieu.  
Historians of science and technology have detailed the revolutionary impact of 
cybernetics as it emerged in the 1940s and spread widely across different natural and social 
sciences from the 1950s onwards. Briefly, the cybernetic theory of control approached the 
governance of behavioral systems as an informational process: a desirable state of a 
governable system (a target) is identified. Then, the path for reaching this target is decided 
upon on the basis of observation of the actual behavior of the system, which is done through 
feedback loops, as well as the anticipation of its future behavior. Cybernetic control theory 
was applied to both the study and engineering of integral, hybrid systems that could 
incorporate men, machines and biological processes.
12
 However, there were limits to the 
                                                          
12
 James Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Informational 
Society (Cambridge, MA 1989); Peter Galison, “The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the 
Cybernetic Vision,” Critical Inquiry, 21/1 (1994), 228-266; Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to 
Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge, MA, 2002); David Mindell, Between 
Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing before Cybernetics (Baltimore, 2002); John 
Agar, The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the Computer (Cambridge, MA, 2003); 
Egle Rindzevičiūtė, “Purification and Hybridisation of Soviet Cybernetics: The Politics of Scientific 
Governance in an Authoritarian Regime,” Archiv fur sozialgeschichte 50 (2010), 289-309; Andrew 
Pickering, The Cybernetic Brain: Sketches of Another Future (Chicago, 2009); Eden Medina, 
Cybernetic Revolutionaries: Technology and Politics in Allende’s Chile (Cambridge, MA, 2011); 
Robert Kline, The Cybernetics Moment: Or Why We Call Our Age the Information Age (Baltimore, 
MD, 2015); Clifford Siskin, System: The Shaping of Modern Knowledge (Cambridge, MA, 2016). 
8 
 
scalability of cybernetic control: the nascent Earth system science could not rely solely on the 
cybernetic control theory to conceptualize and steer human intervention in global change. 
The problem of shooting an agile enemy bomber during World War II, which had given rise 
to cybernetics, was a very different problem from the challenge posed by the accumulation of 
carbo dioxide and slow melting of glacial ice. The control of long-term and large-scale 
processes was of a different order, as its scale exceeded the frameworks of human time. In 
this case, the horizons of change stretched from several decades to hundreds or thousands of 
years. This new problem of large scale, long-term and complex change called for revision of 
the intellectual apparatus of governance. Alternative approaches to cybernetic control had to 
be developed. As a result, the problem of governing the global Earth system came to be 
addressed through complexity science, evolutionary biology, and emerging approaches to 
resilience that operated with the notion of guidance. These concerns, but also conceptual 
approaches, began to shape social sciences as well, particularly through explorations of 
biopolitics and governance through milieu in liberal governmentality studies. 
The idea that governance through milieu constitutes a new form of state intervention 
in the fields characterized by great complexity and uncertainty, such as, for instance, 
population, was proposed by Michel Foucault in his lectures at the Collège de France.
13
 With 
governance through milieu Foucault tried to capture those forms of steering and control 
which did not seek to influence individuals as units, but rather focused on their 
“environment.” Here the environment referred to material systems of relations, which these 
individuals were embedded in and functionally dependent upon.
14
 In doing this, Foucault 
                                                          
13 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–1979 
(Basingstoke and New York, 2009), 20-1, 23. 
14 For Canguilhem’s influence see Jennifer Gabrys, Program Earth: Environmental Sensing 
Technology and the Making of a Computational Planet (Minneapolis, 2016). 
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himself borrowed the concept “milieu” from Georges Canguilhem. According to 
Canguilhem, the contemporary notion of milieu refers to relationality itself, where it is 
impossible to separate the object from its environment.
15
 Since the 1980s, Foucault’s idea of 
government through milieu inspired several influential research agendas: Foucauldian 
scholars historicized colonial attempts to use different milieus, or complex material and 
institutional infrastructures, to control at a distance those colonial subjects who were deemed 
unable to reflexively self-govern themselves.
16
 Urban sociologists and media theorists 
focused on infrastructural milieus’ effects on social and political practices.17 Environmental 
sociologists and historians created a new term “environmentality” to analyze the emerging 
global climate governance.
18
 While these government through milieu studies developed in 
disparate fields, they share a focus on the governmental effects of different types of material 
milieus, be they urban architecture, roads or digital networks.  
This article argues that Moiseev’s thought forms a particularly important part of the 
global history of Earth system governmentality, because it bridges the histories of cybernetics 
and systems analysis on the one side, and the histories of authoritarian, liberal and 
infrastructural governance on the other side. Following the outline of Moiseev’s intellectual 
biography, the main part of the article details how computer-based policy sciences shaped the 
                                                          
15 Georges Canguilhem, “The Living and Its Milieu [translated from the French, originally published 
in 1952],” Grey Room 3 (2001), 7-31. 
16 Tony Bennett, Making Culture, Changing Society (London, 2013); Tony Bennett et al., Collecting, 
Ordering, Governing: Anthropology, Museums, and Liberal Government (Durham and London, 
2017). 
17 Gabrys, Program Earth. 
18 Timothy W. Luke, “On Environmentality: Geo-Power and Eco-Knowledge in the Discourses of 
Contemporary Environmentalism,” Cultural Critique, 31 (1995), 57-81; Arun Agrawal, 
Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of Subjects (Durham, 2005). 
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epistemological framework of the late Soviet thought on Earth systems governance (what 
Moiseev would have identified with the noosphere). The article concludes with a discussion 
of the transformation of the notion of governance from purposive control to guidance through 
milieu, detailing how Moiseev sought to reconcile his ideas of global governance with “the 
really existing” Soviet authoritarian government. 
 
An Institutional Entrepreneur of Complex Systems 
To trace the biography of Moiseev, a scholar who bridged different political regimes, social 
worlds and scientific disciplines, is to trace central shifts in governance in the twentieth-
century. The story of Moiseev is the story of the communist revolution and Russian 
nationalism rooted in an imperial past, but also of technoscientific modernity, based on post-
positivist epistemology and global thinking. It is also a story of the search for political 
rationality and control with the help of the instruments of technoscience, leading to 
fundamental revision of what it means to be rational. To do justice to the personality of 
Moiseev is therefore beyond the limits of this article; I only introduce briefly his intellectual 
and political trajectory. 
Born in Moscow in 1917, Moiseev grew up in a noble family, the legacy of which, as 
he detailed in his memoirs, was expressed in his distaste for the Communist Party, although 
Moiseev passionately endorsed the socialist principle of social equality. Moiseev’s maternal 
grandparents died in cholera epidemics and his mother was adopted by a noble industrialist, 
railway owner Nikolai Karlovich von Mekk. Nikita Moiseev’s father, Nikolai Moiseev, 
graduated from the law faculty at Moscow State University (MGU), was keenly interested in 
economics and statistics, and studied Japanese language and economics as a diplomat in 
Tokyo, Japan. The Moiseev family suffered Stalin’s repressions: the adoptive grandfather 
was shot in 1929 and Moiseev’s father was killed in Butyrki prison in 1931. However, 
11 
 
Moiseev joined the Communist Party during World War II, motivated by his patriotic 
feelings to Russia rather than to the Party.
19
 In his memoir Moiseev reflected extensively on 
his relation to Soviet Russia, trying to reconcile his interest in science and service to the state 
with his painful family history.
20
  
As a child, Moiseev attended the mathematical seminars for talented children 
organized by Israel Gel’fand at the prominent Steklov Institute; he won a national 
competition in mathematics and passed the exams for the department of mathematics and 
mechanics of MGU. However, Moiseev was refused a place on the course because of his 
bourgeois background; only thanks to Gel’fand’s personal support was Moiseev eventually 
enrolled at the university, from where he graduated in 1941.
21
 In 1941 Moiseev was recruited 
to the army, appointed as an engineer to the air force, and sent to the frontline.  
After the war, in 1948-1949 Moiseev was employed in the military-industrial complex 
specializing in rocket technology: as a senior engineer he worked on dynamics and ballistics 
at the missile design institute NII-2 of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry and taught the 
dynamics of guided missiles at the Bauman Moscow State Technical University, where he 
met some of the key scientists behind the Soviet space program, such as Iurii Pobedonostsev, 
                                                          
19 Nikita N. Moiseev, Kak daleko do zavtrashnego dnia... Svobodnye razmyshleniia 1917-1993 [How 
far away is tomorrow… Free  reflections 1917/1993] (Moscow, 1993/2002), 148, 331. A. A. Petrov, 
Nikita Nikolaevich Moiseev: Sud’ba strany v sud’be uchenogo [Nikita Nikolaevich Moiseev: The 
destiny of the country in the destiny of the scientist] (Moscow, 2011). 
20
 Moiseev, Kak daleko, 339. 
21 Moiseev, Kak daleko, 22, 111. 
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Sergei Korolev and Vladimir Chelomei.
22
 However, in 1949 the Moiseev family were again 
repressed: his elderly stepmother was arrested, Moiseev was fired and he fled from Moscow 
in 1950, finding shelter in the Rostov State University, where he taught hydromechanics. 
Only at the beginning of the Thaw in 1956, when Stalin’s terror and personality cult were 
rejected, could Moiseev return to Moscow. The influential academician Mikhail Lavrent’ev, 
the founder of the principal Soviet science city, Akademgorodk, in Novosibirsk, invited 
Moiseev to become a professor and dean at the Department of Control and Applied 
Mathematics (which trained specialists for the Soviet space program) at the Moscow Physics-
Technical Institute (MFTI). In the same year Moiseev was appointed as a researcher at the 
Computer Centre of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, where he would work for more than 
three decades.
23
 In 1966 Moiseev became a corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences (full member in 1970) and was appointed as a vice-director for research of the 
Computer Center in 1967. Moiseev’s scientific contribution to the Soviet military-industrial 
complex, particularly space, aviation and nuclear programs (from 1956 he had clearance to 
access high level classified data), and his unparalleled social skills, propelled him into the 
position of research director at the Computer Centre in the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The 
Computer Centre became established as the leading research center in computer science, 
                                                          
22 For more on Soviet space program, see Asif Sidiqqi, The Red Rocket’s Glare: Spaceflight and the 
Russian Imagination, 1857-1957 (Cambridge, 2010); Slava Gerovitch, Voices of the Space Program: 
Cosmonauts, Soldiers, and Engineers Who Took the USSR into Space (London, 2014). 
23
 Moiseev, Kak daleko, 25-28; Nikita N. Moiseev, Izbrannye trudy [Selected works] (Moscow, 
2003), 261. Moiseev retired from the Computer Centre in 1987, but served as a member of the 
Centre’s directors’ board, alongside several other high governmental posts, until 2000. 
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applied mathematics and automation, providing support, for instance, for Pavel Sukhoi’s jet-
fighter design lab.  
In addition to tapping into the Cold War arms race, Moiseev’s career coincided with 
the opening of the Soviet system to the West and Prime Minister’s Kosygin’s call to 
introduce scientific forecasting to Soviet planning and management.
24
 Here Moiseev bridged 
academia and government by initiating several strategically important and intellectually 
innovative fields: operations research, the systems approach and, from the 1970s, computer-
based modelling of complex environmental and socioeconomic processes. Having established 
a solid reputation as an applied mathematician, Moiseev worked closely with several 
founding figures of innovative research institutions, such as Lavrent’ev, scholars working in 
diverse fields falling under the umbrella term of cybernetics, including the influential 
mathematician Aleksandr Lyapunov, who taught Moiseev mathematics at university in the 
1930s, and with whom Moiseev had a long-lasting friendship, and Viktor Glushkov, who 
would launch the ambitious but unsuccessful program of the all-union computer network.
25
 
                                                          
24 Eglė Rindzevičiūtė, “A Struggle for the Soviet Future: The Birth of Scientific Forecasting in the 
Soviet Union,” Slavic Review, 75/1 (2016), 52-76. 
25 For Moiseev’s links with mathematical economics see Ivan Boldyrev and Olessia Kirtchik, “The 
Cultures of Mathematical Economics in the Postwar Soviet Union: More than a Method, Less Than a 
Discipline,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 63 (2017), 1-10. For Lavrent’ev’s 
role in the modernization of Soviet science, see Ksenia Tatarchenko, “Calculating a Showcase: 
Mikhail Lavrentiev, the Politics of Expertise, and the International Life of the Siberian Science-City,” 
Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, 46/5 (2016), 592-632. For Moiseev’s correspondence with 
Lyapunov, see the Open Archive of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, fund of 
A.A. Lyapunov, odasib.ru. For Gluskhov, see Benjamin Peters, How Not to Network a Nation 
(Cambridge, MA, 2016). 
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Fluent in French (he also read English), Moiseev travelled abroad and actively forged links 
with leading Western scholars. These trips inspired Moiseev to integrate Vernadskii’s theory 
of the biosphere and noosphere with computer-based control sciences.  
The 1960s were characterized by continued technoscientific optimism, but also by 
growing awareness of the ineffectiveness of Soviet planning, stalling economic growth, 
concern with the environment and increasing pollution.
26
 Moiseev encountered the emerging 
“integrative imagination” of environmental change as a mathematician specializing in control 
processes. The idea of the environment as a system of relations which is changing and needs 
to be explained, and not just a context that can be used to explain changes in organisms, 
emerged after 1948 in the writings of William Vogt and Fairfield Osborn. In 1955, a Wenner-
Gren symposium Man Changing the Face of the Earth consolidated what would become 
environmental thinking as a form of concern about global, long-term and future-oriented 
changes. The term “environment” entered policy use in 1957 when the British governmental 
science advisor Solly Zuckerman proposed the notion of the “environmental sciences.”27 The 
development of scientific environmental thinking was somewhat delayed in the Soviet Union, 
but Moiseev’s writings reveal similar concerns to those of the systems scholars Donella and 
Dennis Meadows, the polymath James Lovelock and the economist Kenneth Boulding, to 
mention but a few Earth system thinkers, who crossed disciplinary boundaries to 
                                                          
26 Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev 
(Chapel Hill, 2009); Charles Ziegler, Environmental Policy in the USSR (Amherst, 1987). 
27 Paul Warde and Sverker Sörlin, “Expertise for the Future: the Emergence of ‘Relevant Knowledge’ 
in Environmental Predictions and Global Change, c.1920-1970,” in Jenny Andersson and Eglė 
Rindzevičiūtė, eds., The Struggle for the Long Term in Transnational Science and Politics during the 
Cold War (New York, 2015), 39-62. 
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conceptualize co-evolving Earth and human systems in the 1970s-1980s. However, in 
contrast to the Meadows, Lovelock and Boulding, Moiseev distinctively focused on the 
epistemology of governance and control. 
By the 1960s the Soviet policy science community was ready to embrace the 
environmental turn not only because they were concerned with the pollution and preservation 
of nature. Soviet scholars were also attracted to the idea of the environment as a hybrid 
system, which integrated human and non-human actors. Conceived as part of the 
environmental system, society and human behavior could be explored scientifically outside 
Marxist-Leninist dogmas.
28
 To define the communist society as “Earth’s living matter” in 
effect meant to depoliticize the social. Of course, such depoliticization offered only a relative 
freedom: scientists experienced many institutional obstacles accessing data and providing 
direct input in policy-making. For instance, from the early 1960s the Soviet government 
invested heavily in the economic applications of mathematics. A specialist in dynamic 
programming and optimization of decision-making in technical systems, Moiseev was 
enthusiastic about applying his expertise to economic planning and began to advise the State 
Planning Committee (Gosplan) regarding the development of social indicators of economic 
growth. However, Moiseev soon realized that Gosplan based the planning process not so 
much on scientific expertise, but on political negotiation and ritual.
29
 Furthermore, not only 
was the quality of the economic statistics data poor, but access to it was very limited. Most 
                                                          
28 Joan DeBardeleben, The Environment and Marxism-Leninism: The Soviet and East German 
Experience (Boulder, CO, 1985); Oleg Ianitskii, “Environmental Sociology Yesterday and Today,” 
Sociological Research, 33/1 (1994), 7-32 at 9. 
29 For ritualistic scientific expertise in Soviet planning see Peter Rutland, The Myth of the Plan: 
Lessons of Soviet Planning Experience (London, 1985).  
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importantly, Moiseev became convinced that the economy was too complex to be 
mathematized: that the very assumption of regular economic development and planning (in 
Russian, planomernoe razvitie) was conceptually erroneous. Quantitative policy science 
alone, argued Moiseev, could not guarantee efficient governance of the national economy, be 
it communist or capitalist.  
Moiseev crystallized this view during his visits as a guest professor at Yale 
University, where he was invited by the economist and, later, Nobel Prize winner Tjalling 
Koopmans in 1974 and 1976.
30
 In a paper presented for the Yale faculty, Moiseev proposed 
the idea of the ultimate ungovernability of economics. Just like Norbert Wiener, Moiseev 
argued that socioeconomic processes were far too complex to be captured by existing 
computer modelling techniques.
31
 Moiseev even suggested that the term “planned economy” 
was an oxymoron. He proposed to use the term “guided economy” instead of governed (or 
controlled) economy (napravliaemaia ekonomika instead of upravliaemaia ekonomika, in 
Russian). Koopmans, reportedly, “did not like this paper at all,” and Moiseev became 
apprehensive about the possible political consequences of his talk. He was relieved to find 
out later that back in Moscow “no one had even noticed it.”32  
In his memoir, Moiseev reported having lost his belief in the capacity of positivist 
science and mathematical applications to make long-term economic forecasts in the late 
1960s, which is ironic, because in 1968 he co-established what would become one of the 
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leading centers of economic modeling in the country.
33
 Convinced that the growth of 
scientific expertise increases the rate of change in socioeconomic systems (increasing 
availability of knowledge makes decision-making harder rather than easier), Moiseev turned 
to the issues of complexity, evolution and self-organization. Considering that policy sciences 
could be more fruitfully applied to environmental problems than economical ones, he began 
to develop computer-based modelling of the biosphere and to rethink the fundamentals of 
governability and control.
34
 
Moiseev did not develop these ideas in isolation: encounters with Vernadskiian 
scholars and links with Western scientists were vital. For instance, when Moiseev visited a 
French research center dedicated to the management of large technical systems in 
Fontainebleau near Paris, he stayed in the Latin Quarter, drove a small Renault, read 
Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom in French, and regularly met with Russian expatriate 
intellectuals, such as the Russian microbiologist Sergei Vinogradskii’s daughter, who met 
Vernadskii in Bergson’s seminars in Paris.35 Moiseev participated in major East-West 
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cooperation schemes, such as the Unesco program Man and Biosphere launched in 1971, 
events organized by the Club of Rome in relation to its first report The Limits to Growth 
(1972), the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA, established in 
Laxenburg, Austria, in 1972) and the Paris Institut de la Vie, founded by the French policy 
activist Maurice Marois in 1971. Having initiated one of the first Soviet computer 
laboratories modelling geophysical and biological processes in land, ocean and atmosphere at 
the Computer Centre, Moiseev had contacts with climate research centers at Livermore and 
the University of Oregon, USA. Finally, under the auspices of the International Council of 
Scientific Unions (ICSU), Moiseev participated in the follow-up study of the environmental 
consequences of nuclear war in 1983-1985.  
From the early 1970s Moiseev published widely on the applications of policy sciences 
for economic and organizational planning, drawing on theoretical advances in cybernetics 
and systems analysis.
36
 His later work drew inspiration from Vernadskii’s writings on the 
biosphere and noosphere, resulting in the publication of Man, Society, and the Environment 
(1980), Man and Biosphere (1985) and The Algorithm of Development (1987). The latter 
book, which was reworked into Man and Noosphere, and printed in a 100,000 copy run in 
1990, argued that governability and control were central intellectual issues in the age of 
mankind as a geological force.  
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Moiseev was by no means alone in the emerging field of Earth system governance in 
the Soviet Union: he drew on the work of the leading atmosphere and climate engineering 
scientist Mikhail Budyko, who significantly advanced biosphere thinking into what was then 
a nascent global ecological science.
37
 The prominent geophysicist Evgenii Fedorov’s writings 
on the interaction between man and biosphere as a social and governmental issue formed 
another important influence.
38
 Moiseev’s competence in mathematical modeling also helped 
him to forge interdisciplinary links: according to Weiner, by the mid-1970s mathematical 
methods became the dominant approach in Soviet environmental and ecological science, 
promoted by scientists following Timofeev-Resovskii’s intellectual lineage. However, there 
were important political cleavages among the pioneers of mathematized environmental 
governance. Some environmental scientists, such as Stanislav Shvarts and Evgenii Fedorov 
were strongly committed to the centralist, scientific projects of the transformation of nature, 
while others, such as Nikolai Reimers and Moiseev, were deeply skeptical about it.
39
 Unlike 
ecologists, who were interested in preservation, Moiseev sought to extend mathematical 
insights into self-organization to the governance of the biosphere. Initially this intellectual 
pursuit fell on deaf ears: Moiseev wrote that even bright mathematical biologists, like 
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Svirezhev, and mathematical cyberneticians, like Lyapunov, did not appreciate his interest in 
the epistemology of the governability of the complex organization of the biosphere.
40
 
Moiseev’s breakthrough came during the escalation of the Cold War under Ronald 
Reagan in 1983, when Moiseev became widely known as the patron of the Soviet study of the 
environmental effects of nuclear war. In 1982 Paul Crutzen and John Birks formulated the 
hypothesis that a nuclear exchange would cause a global darkening and cooling. This 
hypothesis was tested jointly by US-Soviet scientists who simulated several scenarios of the 
environmental consequences of nuclear war on the General Circulation Models (GCMs) of 
global climate in 1983. These simulations confirmed the hypothesis of nuclear winter and the 
less harsh scenario, nuclear autumn, where the Northern hemisphere would experience less 
devastating cooling. In both cases the study established that nuclear war would cause 
irreversible climate change. Led by Moiseev, the Soviet team gathered such leading scientists 
as atmosphere physicists Georgii Golitsyn and Vladimir Aleksandrov, climatologist Mikhail 
Budyko, and population biologist Iurii Svirezhev.   
The nuclear winter study influenced nuclear strategy, disarmament and Earth system 
science, but can also be argued to have contributed to the development of Moiseev’s concept 
of the noosphere, where the biosphere can become governable once the principle of 
governance through milieu is applied, and Crutzen’s concept of the epochal change to the 
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Anthropocene.
41
 Indeed, both the noosphere and the Anthropocene are epochal and analytical 
concepts, as they indicate a historically changing relationship between mankind and the 
Earth. The key difference between these terms is that Crutzen’s Anthropocene sought to draw 
attention to scientific evidence of humanity’s geological impact on the planet (he was not the 
first to propose this), whereas Moiseev borrowed Vernadskii’s concept of the noosphere to 
explore the potential and limit of the application of policy sciences on the global level. It is 
important to add, however, that both Crutzen and Moiseev called for the renewal of a global 
governmental agenda. For instance, in his seminal article Crutzen connected the 
Anthropocene with the control revolution, the rise of automation since James Watt’s 
invention of the steam engine, writing that control is the key problem posed by this new era: 
“a daunting task lies ahead for scientists and engineers to guide society towards 
environmentally sustainable management during the era of the Anthropocene.”42 It is quite 
remarkable that Moiseev attempted to do just that some two decades earlier on the other side 
of the Iron Curtain. 
From 1980 Moiseev began to popularize the global modelling of the biosphere and 
speak up for grave environmental problems, both in the Soviet Union and the West. He saw 
this policy entrepreneurship as ushering of the noosphere, where global biospheric change 
becomes governable and began to engage with higher levels of politics. Moiseev’s 
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publications in influential journals paved the way for the introduction of global problems in 
the CPSU’s program in 1985. Together with the prominent Russian physicist Evgenii 
Velikhov, Moiseev was appointed to the commission set up to clean up Chernobyl after the 
explosion in 1986.
43
 Later, Moiseev became the president of the Green Cross Russia, an 
international organization that was established by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1993 to deal with the 
environmental consequences of military activities. Moiseev also chaired the State Council for 
the Analysis of Crisis Situations and was the president of the Russian National Committee for 
the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). In 1995 UNEP awarded Moiseev the 
Global 500 Award; Paul Crutzen would receive this prize the next year.  
Moiseev differed from typical Soviet science or civic activists: instead of pursuing 
specific issue-driven agendas, he sought to fundamentally transform the intellectual apparatus 
underlying global governance. His position toward the official government institutions could 
be described as an enterprising “reform technocrat,” to borrow a phrase from David 
Priestland.
44
 Moiseev saw his duty as enlightening policy makers and facilitating new 
institutional designs for governing complexity, using the noosphere theory to establish 
conceptual and institutional links between expanding geophysical sciences and public policy 
sciences.
45
 Accordingly, in what follows, I focus not so much on the theory of the noosphere 
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as an instrument to legitimize environmental protection in the Soviet Union, but as part of a 
new complex of governance through milieu, one that required definition of new notions of 
rationality and control that go beyond the idea that global processes can be steered on the 
basis of cybernetics. 
 
Transnational Development of the Biosphere and Noosphere  
Although the term biosphere and the name of Vernadskii occasionally surfaced in specialist 
writings in the West, such as Eugene Odum’s influential textbook Fundamentals of Ecology 
(1953, translated into Russian in 1968), it was only at a Unesco conference in 1968 that the 
term biosphere was first used in the context of international science and policy.
46
 Since then, 
the development and spread of the biosphere concept has been documented in many histories 
of geosciences, but it is less widely known that the concept of the biosphere also entered 
management and policy sciences, in parallel with the rise of the systems approach, a 
transdisciplinary science of organization that rose to prominence in the East and West from 
the late 1960s.
47
  
The concept of the biosphere was introduced into Soviet policy discourses and 
systems thinking in the late 1950s. Vernadskii’s ideas inspired different scholars, ranging 
from climate science (Mikhail Budyko, Evgenii Fedorov), soil science (Viktor Kovda, with 
whom Moiseev was in a close professional relation) to anthropology (Lev Gumilev, with 
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whose interpretation of the noosphere Moiseev strongly disagreed).
48
 For Moiseev the central 
figure was the geneticist Nikolai Timofeev-Resovskii, who was based in the secret science 
city of Obninsk, home to the world’s first commercial nuclear power plant, and who was 
among the first ones to revive Vernadskii’s theory of the biosphere after the end of the 
Stalinist era in 1956. Moiseev met Timofeev-Resovskii through the mathematical biologist 
Iurii Svirezhev; this encounter led to regular meetings-turned-informal-seminars in Moiseev’s 
office, which often ran late into the evening. Discussions with Timofeev-Resovskii not only 
enthused Moiseev to develop computer applications for modelling interactions among 
geophysical and living systems, but also facilitated Moiseev’s friendship with Kovda, an 
influential Soviet Russian scientist who was involved in the setting up of the Unesco program 
Man and the Biosphere.
49
  
In addition to biologists and pedologists, Moiseev fostered relations with scholars at 
the Central Geophysical Laboratory in Leningrad, the Institutes of Oceonography and 
Geography, and MGU. His networks did not stop at the Iron Curtain: Moiseev met Jay 
Forrester and Dennis Meadows at the first Unesco Conference on Global Problems in Venice, 
Italy, in 1971. Capitalizing on the momentum in the wake of the Venice conference and the 
subsequent publication of The Limits to Growth (1972), Moiseev obtained a grant to create 
two laboratories for mathematical modelling of the biosphere, which were awarded by the 
chairman of the section of Earth Sciences at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Aleksandr 
Sidorenko. This institutional innovation must be seen in both domestic and international 
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political contexts: while the Soviet Union began to actively brand its foreign policy with 
global environmental concerns, such prominent scientists as Budyko and Fedorov began to 
publish specialist and popular books on the global environmental crisis. The emerging 
computer-based global modelling was an important nexus that bridged techno-optimism and 
global concerns. For instance, in his long afterword for Forrester’s World Dynamics 
(published in Russian in 1978), Moiseev declared that computer simulation of complex 
biosphere processes could provide a scientific foundation for world government.
50
 The 
Russian translation of World Dynamics resonated widely: Moiseev’s name became familiar 
in the circles of cultural and environmental dissidents.
51
  
Having borrowed Vernadskii’s idea of mankind as a geological force and inspired by 
Vernadskii’s vision of the noosphere where scientific reason would organize planetary 
development, Moiseev operationalized Vernadskii’s geophysical philosophy to rethink the 
wider governmental implications of mathematical methods, drawing on insights from OR, 
systems theory, computer-based modelling, ecology and climate science. In his writings, 
Moiseev used the terms biosphere and noosphere often interchangeably, but generally by the 
noosphere he referred to the near future when the application of policy sciences to global 
planetary governance would be possible both conceptually and institutionally. First and 
foremost, Moiseev was interested in the applied mathematical side of rational planetary 
governance: here Moiseev was deeply influenced by Henri Poincare’s work on differential 
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equations. Indeed, mathematical thinking about parameters and limits led Moiseev to define 
governmental rationality as thinking from the limits, rather than as a maximizing or 
optimizing process.
52
 Moiseev also read Teilhard de Chardin’s The Human Phenomenon and 
was familiar with James Lovelock’s Gaia theory, which was first formulated in the 1960s; 
indeed, the first computer-based modelling system of global ecology at the Computer Center 
was called “Gaia” in the early 1980s.53 Moiseev certainly knew work by Paul Erlich, a US 
biologist and active public policy lobbyist who popularized the term coevolution in the West 
in the late 1960s; these two scientists met through the nuclear winter project in the early 
1980s.
54
 While coevolution was defined by Erlich and Peter Raven as a reciprocal change in 
the interaction of different species, Moiseev extended this definition to embrace the 
coevolution of living and non-living matter.
55
 In addition to Dokuchaev, Bogdanov, 
Vernadskii and Teihard du Chardin, important influences were Budyko’s and Federov’s 
writing on global climate, Kovda’s writings on waste, Piotr Anokhin’s work on biological 
cybernetics, and Ivan Schmalhausen’s work on evolution, all of which Moiseev put in 
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dialogue with ideas on changing systems and self-organizing order developed by such 
scientists as molecular biologist Manfred Elgen, energy dissipation theorist Lars Onsager, 
and, obviously, Norbert Wiener’s cybernetics. Furthermore, Moiseev touched upon political 
economy debates by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Vilfredo Paretto and, at a later stage, 
Hayek. Although Moiseev paid dues to dialectical philosophy, making occasional references 
to Karl Marx and Hegel, he made it clear that Marxist approaches were insufficient to 
understand the complexity of global coevolution. In many ways, then, Moiseev’s style of 
thinking was close to synergetics, but his originality was in cross-fertilizing ideas from 
different fields to redefine the notion of global governance, which is considered in the next 
section. 
 
Post-Cybernetic Governance of the Global Biosphere 
In the 1980s Moiseev joined the ranks of scholars alerting governments to the fact that the 
coevolution of the man and the biosphere could not be left ungoverned: mankind’s activities 
had become such a significant factor that the whole biosphere was deteriorating, facing the 
risk of nuclear war, industrial accidents, pollution and, ultimately, carbon dioxide-induced 
climate change, while growing production and consumption was causing depletion of global 
resources.
56
 In order to address these complex issues from the perspective of cybernetic 
predictive rationality, one has to identify a desirable state of the global system, establish 
policy targets and allocate pathways for achieving those targets by optimal control methods. 
However, such an intellectual model of steering can only be applied to relatively stable and 
simple systems. In contrast, change in the global biosphere is driven by complex, contingent 
factors that affect different scales of the system differently. Causal mechanisms at the micro 
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level are often decoupled from processes at the macro level: for instance, the individual 
behavior of an animal does not explain the collective behavior of a pack of animals, because 
the two are different systems. While the planetary system is highly regular and predictable, 
many sub-systems of the Earth, such as the weather, or human economies and societies, are 
not predictable in the long term.
57
 
Could global Earth governance ever be rationalized? According to Moiseev, it is only 
possible if we use a particular concept of governance and rationality. Mankind’s role as a 
geological force, argued Moiseev, can be theorized as a process of self-organization, where 
living and non-living natural components intertwine and shape each other. In this process, 
wrote Moiseev, the ontological distinction between man and nature becomes redundant. 
Accordingly, the science of the global biosphere should approach changes in society and 
nature not as a clash between two essentially different systems, but as the coevolution of 
particular organizational forms.
58
 Proposing that “organization” is a fundamental concept just 
like “energy” and “matter,” Moiseev defined organization as stabilization, a condition where 
variables are conservative and change slowly.
59
 In other words, things that change more 
slowly are more “organized.” Mankind’s role on Earth, then, is to become a wise and 
responsible organizer, to slow down the global environmental changes that are spurred by 
human activities. Equipped with scientific data, methods and computer technology, man 
could become “a master of the biosphere,” but not in the sense that man would finally 
“conquer nature” (a popular trope of the Soviet discourse of progress). Man would become a 
manager, not a master of the biosphere, able to “consciously use the resources of the planet in 
                                                          
57 Moiseev, Chelovek i noosfera, 55. 
58 Moiseev, Chelovek i noosfera, 141. 
59 Moiseev, Chelovek i noosfera, 61. 
29 
 
order to guarantee the conditions for co-evolution.”60 In this way, Moiseev proposed that it 
would be intellectually consistent to base the principles of the governance of global 
development not on acceleration and growth, but on slowing down the rate of change. In 
doing this, mankind could no longer rely on self-organization through adaptation to the 
changing environment, because the environment had begun to change in such a way that 
adaptation was not a viable strategy anymore. Therefore, adaptation, which Moiseev termed 
“the strategy of nature,” must be replaced by “a strategy of Reason,” a new mentality of 
governance based on a qualitatively different scientific definition of what can be considered 
as rational and effective control.
61
 
First, in order to think meaningfully about rational governance of the global Earth 
system, one must go beyond the hegemony of the cybernetic notion of purposive, teleological 
control. Moiseev’s argument proceeds in the following way: predictive control in cybernetic 
engineering systems is only possible under conditions where the purpose of the system which 
is being controlled is known. Consider the classical problem of the antiaircraft defense 
system: if the enemy pilot’s intention (target) is known, the trajectory of the plane and the 
missile can be predicted with a high level of certainty and the enemy bomber can be hit. 
However, this model of control is difficult to apply to complex systems, such as human 
societies, which are characterized by multiple, intertwined processes and intentions and are 
therefore less predictable. Different actors can evaluate the same situation differently or have 
contradictory goals. Even if a shared goal is agreed upon, there can be many different ways of 
achieving it.
62
 Whereas this social complexity makes teleological control mechanisms, e.g. 
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social policy, very difficult to translate from an intellectual program into action, the 
geophysical complexity of the global Earth system (the interaction of the atmosphere, the 
ocean and the land) makes teleological control simply redundant.  
The question of whether the global Earth system can be described as a purposive 
system has actually bothered many bright minds. Some thinkers, such as James Lovelock, 
considered that the Earth can be seen as teleological, proposing that all ecological systems, 
including the planet Earth, actively seek homeostasis, a particular state of equilibrium. 
However, Moiseev did not believe in naturally occurring homeostasis and was highly aware 
of historical examples of unpredictable and catastrophic changes to biospheric systems. 
According to Moiseev, the very idea of equilibrium promised a false hope of control and was 
dangerous, because it obscured the fact that human activities impacted geophysical processes 
in non-linear ways, which could never be fully understood. The outcomes of interventions 
into the biosphere could never be predicted with confidence over the long-term. Furthermore, 
Moiseev argued that it is centrally important to recognize that, in the case of the Earth 
system, the governing bodies are not outside, but inside the system that is being governed.  
Drawing on systems theories of increasing complexity, Moiseev posited that 
theoretically the controlling center coevolves with the controlled system by being part of it. 
Controlling interventions make the system ever more complex and uncertain.
63
 In this way, 
Moiseev viewed the optimal governability of the environment significantly differently from 
many Soviet contemporaries. Such influential environmental scientists as Fedorov used their 
scientific authority to criticize the irrational use of global natural resources, at the same time 
carefully aligning their arguments with the ideological doctrine of the political superiority of 
communism and the commitment to growth. For instance, Fedorov proclaimed that the long 
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term global goals of world governance could only be achieved by replacing the capitalist 
system with a socialist society, where environmental governance could be put to optimal, 
rational use.
64
  
In contrast, Moiseev argued that the political identity of the governmental system was 
largely irrelevant for Earth system governance. While growth, in many cases, was a problem 
not a solution, the key issue was the understanding of control that had to be revised. In Soviet 
policy sciences “control” was defined as “purposive governance” (in Russian, upravlenie): an 
intellectual, interventionist activity based on information. According to the ideal model of 
cybernetic control, any given object of control must be thoroughly examined by scientists; its 
behavior must be monitored, tracked and predicted. If the controlled object is a social 
collective, e.g. an organization, a state, a sector of the economy, the control of its behavior 
must be institutionalized through a centralist bureaucracy and the political Party apparatus, 
which sets the object’s goals for the future. This cybernetic model of steering proliferated in 
Soviet management literature. Such diverse activities as the performative brain, a 
management unit in a firm, and Gosplan were described as being able to formulate goals, 
project them into the future and reflexively adjust the behavior of the systems under their 
control according to changes in the environment.
65
 It was precisely this intellectual model of 
control that formed the basis for Viktor Glushkov’s project of OGAS, the all-union 
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computerization network.
66
 However, in the case of the global Earth system, wrote Moiseev, 
there was no certain knowledge to be had, there were too many intertwined behavioral 
systems to control and, importantly, there was no central authority to set the goals. What can 
it mean to govern the Earth system, if it is unpredictable and uncontrollable? 
 In response to this question, Moiseev offered what can be described as a post-
cybernetic theory of governance, although Moiseev himself does not use this term. First, 
according to Moiseev, the institution of predictive scientific expertise remains relevant at 
lower scales of the Earth system: statistical forecasting can map long- and short-term 
consequences that could potentially destabilize the biosphere.
67
 At the global scale, these 
negative consequences must be prevented by establishing boundaries and thresholds to 
human activities, such as limits to local and aggregate levels of pollution, exploitation of 
resources and the extinction of species. In this way, the lower level predictive scientific 
expertise forms an important basis for managing higher levels of complexity, the global scale 
and the long term. However, the gap between these two levels can only be bridged if the 
prevailing governmental attitude to precision and certainty is abandoned. The role of 
scientists in Earth system governance (what Vernadskii and Moiseev would describe as the 
noosphere: the biosphere plus governmental apparatus) is to identify basic, crude parameters 
that define the boundaries of global environmental change within which mankind’s biological 
survival is possible. This sort of scientific knowledge can only be approximate, imperfect and 
uncertain. This is a very different requirement, if compared with the epistemological grounds 
for cybernetic control, which seeks to make predictions as precise as possible. For Moiseev, 
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the crudeness of knowledge is not a problem, but an asset: it is important not to eliminate 
uncertainty by offering false precision.  
Second, this crude, parametric knowledge of the limits must be made actionable. 
Positive, target-based control must be replaced with negative guidance. To govern the global 
biosphere, according to Moiseev, is not to govern prescriptively (do x, y, z), but to govern 
prohibitively (do whatever except for x, y, z). Here the governor does not impose a concrete 
goal on the governed system, but instead imposes limits through a system of prohibitions.
68
  
Moiseev terms this type of control as “guided development,” one which abandons 
goals, intentions and informational control and is therefore different from “the control of a 
process” (napravliaemoe razvitie versus upravlenie processom). Moiseev employs 
mathematical language and hydromechanics metaphors to describe such negative guidance: 
he writes about “algorithms” and “channels” of development that must be used to establish 
not targets, but prohibitions or taboos, which would set limits to those human activities which 
are deemed to threaten the desirable evolution of the biosphere. Mankind, in this way, is left 
in principle free to formulate and pursue its many different goals, as long as their actions 
remain within the boundaries of given parameters. Moiseev imagined human activity to be 
channeled like a water stream in such a way that it does not disturb the biosphere.
69
  
Scientific articulation and institutionalization of these thresholds serve as the 
epistemological foundations for a global post-cybernetic governance. The intellectual purpose 
                                                          
68 Moiseev, Chelovek i noosfera, 319. 
69 Moiseev, Chelovek i noosfera, 316-19. Moiseev noted that his concept of guided development is 
similar in principle to the prominent geographer Lev Berg’s concept of “guided evolution,” although 
Berg based his theory on completely different argumentation. Nikita Moiseev, Izbrannye trudy 
(Moscow, 2003), 111. 
34 
 
of the limits is not to limit the autonomy of individuals and social groups, but to serve as 
cognitive channels, a computer-mediated milieu, guiding pluralistic social self-organization. 
Limits, not targets come first in policy decisions.  
Debates on “critical thresholds” of climate change and the ensuing securitization and 
risk management abounded among Western climate scientists in the early 1990s.
70
 Moiseev 
saw these debates not as a mere technical quibble, but as a central component of the post-
cybernetic governmentality of the noosphere. In this respect Moiseev’s view is close to what 
Timothy O’Riordan and Steve Rayner describe as “precautionary science”: government of 
high complexity must combine intuition and foresight rather than knowledge that claims 
certainty.
71
 However, whereas O’Riordan and Rayner promote the role of scientists as 
persuaders, ensuring institutional pluralism,  Moiseev wanted to redefine the very notion of 
rationality and control and spread these new notions among a wide range of decision makers. 
Moiseev wanted to change the epistemological culture of global governance that mobilized 
the notions of intention, prediction, certainty and linear control. It is important to note that 
since the late 1990s policy makers’ responses to uncertainty were mapped and theorized in 
the influential scholarship on the politics of preparedness.
72
 Particularly important is the work 
on the adoption and implementation of the concept of resilience, developed by C. S. Holling 
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at the East-West think tank IIASA, with which Moiseev was also closely involved, in the 
1970s-1980s.
73
 In this context, Moiseev’s efforts to develop a conceptual, technical and 
institutional basis for governing uncertainty at a global scale in the Soviet Union during the 
period when the Soviet economic system was in severe decline are indeed quite remarkable. 
What drove him to innovate in this way? I suggest that Moiseev’s project was as much 
political as it was scientific. 
Being experienced in both scientific research and policy, Moiseev harbored no naïve 
hopes that Earth system science could provide certainty or that scientific experts could 
directly influence Soviet, or indeed, any, policy decisions. He therefore never offered any 
“optimal solutions,” particularly in the long-term. Instead, Moiseev cautioned against the 
illusion that such solutions may exist (hence his fierce criticism of the term “sustainable 
development”). Instead of long-term solutions, he called for the creation of forms of long-
term engagement in the process of a continuous search for compromise, a process in which 
globally accessible scientific expertise would be co-produced with stakeholders. New, 
specially designed “institutes of agreement” would have to be developed for this purpose, 
ideally under the auspices of the UN.
74
  
However, this institutional change at the international level alone would not suffice: 
the conceptualization of governance and control must change as well. Moiseev argued that it 
would be impossible to define and solve the problems of the global biosphere if the 
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underlying discourse remained based on a teleological, cybernetic notion of control and a 
reductionist expectation of a linear, deterministic analysis of complex process. Nowhere 
could this concern be more adequately placed than in the Soviet Union, where the Party and 
industry leaders were blind to persuasion from below and suspicious of anybody who 
questioned the value of certainty and centralist leadership. Accordingly, Moiseev proposed to 
abandon centralist control, based on the idea (but not practice) of long-term forecasting and 
plans, replacing it with negative, regulatory government through taboos. Like Kenneth 
Arrow, Moiseev recognized that it is impossible to reach a global agreement on the target 
outcomes of environmental protection because of starkly different standards of living and 
social and political preferences. The consensus on the limits of global environmental change, 
however, could be achieved. The desirable target would be universally defined as a state of 
the biosphere that ensures human survival; its parameters would be set by Earth system 
scientists, engaged in cross-border cooperation in data collection and modeling, thus 
producing a cognitive, computer-mediated milieu for governance.  
Thinking from the limits would lead to different policy solutions: Moiseev made a 
range of such proposals, applying post-cybernetic guidance in the areas of national security, 
economy and the environment, following Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms of the Soviet 
economy and state after 1986.
75
 For instance, instead of complicated institutional bargaining 
over the reduction of nuclear arsenal trying to identify which types of weapons should be 
decommissioned first, Moiseev proposed limiting the efficiency of nuclear defense by 
imposing new constraints on it. All nuclear nations would cooperate, creating a vast and 
expensive global surveillance system, enabling all members to track the activities in their 
nuclear sectors. A surprise launch of a nuclear missile and retaliation would become 
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strategically impossible and nuclear weapons would eventually become obsolete.
76
 In the 
economy, Moiseev wanted to abolish “authoritarian planning,” introducing market 
mechanisms as conductors for negative feedback in the economy. However, this 
liberalization would only be beneficial if limits to the markets were established, providing 
guidance toward socially desirable goals.
77
 Such negative guidance could take place on the 
basis of global ecological information databases, scientific projects which would be linked to 
the political institutes of agreement concerned with the global future. The limits for global 
environmental planning would be set in the light of loads that local and regional social and 
economic systems could bear, thus ensuring the welfare of local populations.
78
 For Moiseev, 
scientific expertise, particularly computer modelling, was vital for the establishment of such 
taboos or thresholds, forming a socio-informational milieu of decision-making which would 
socialize the governing elites into these new notions of a rationality of limits and guidance.  
Moiseev never detailed how this cognitive milieu could be translated into national 
legislation and institutions. It is clear that Moiseev avoided antagonizing Soviet political 
leaders, proposing what was an epistemological infrastructure for a-political solutions to 
global problems. However, technical solutions have their own politics: this has been made 
clear in Foucauldian research on the governmental effects of material milieus, such as urban, 
transport and energy infrastructure, the construction of which shapes local populations.
79
 The 
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next section proposes that Moiseev’s governance through guidance is just such a political 
project of informational infrastructure. 
 
The politics of post-cybernetic governance through milieu 
In order to be actionable upon, the complex Earth system must be subjected to a particular 
form of articulation, one which Theodore Porter called a “thin description,” which is 
expressed (ideally) in a mathematical language.
80
 Soviet global modelers had long argued 
that those computer simulations, which seek to represent the full complexity of geophysical 
and anthropogenic processes were useful only for scientific heuristic purposes, not for policy 
decisions.
81
 As O’Riordan and Rayner would later observe, the method of computer-based 
modelling uses a simplified system of discreet elements, which does not replicate faithfully 
the complex character of the biosphere.
82
 The simplicity and reductionism of global models, 
wrote Moiseev, does not necessarily produce erroneous results: the data is but one component 
of scientific expertise for policy making. The governance of the complex, global biosphere 
should be based on relatively primitive models, because such models can identify the most 
significant causal effects and major trends. Whether this approximate information is 
sufficient for the establishment of the limits to guide development, it is possible to judge only 
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on the basis of a combination of scientific, social and pragmatic intelligence, which is 
fundamentally important in modelling such complex systems. This is why Moiseev did not 
limit his interest to mathematical modelling, but sought to transform the very conceptual and 
institutional contexts in which modelling was used: his theoretical ambition was to bridge the 
so-called “cultural lag” between advanced scientific and technological knowledge and 
societal and political values.
83
  
This debate on the quality and use of models and data pointed to the fact that the post-
cybernetic governance of the global biosphere required the repositioning of the institution of 
scientific expertise in relation to the government: for Moiseev, Soviet global modelers were 
not mere advisors (providers of feedback), but creators of the entire milieu for decision 
making. Furthermore, this Soviet vision of governance through milieu adds an important 
focus to the Foucauldian studies of negative, liberal governance, where governance through 
milieu is generally associated with the regulation of subjects considered unable to govern 
themselves. This approach enabled top-down government-at-a-distance without relying on 
the mechanism of self-regulation, as the capacity to self-regulate has been seen as absent in 
such subjects of governance as the working class, criminals or indigenous peoples. As Tony 
Bennett put it, “It is particularly in relation to populations that are excluded from the forms of 
self-action identified with liberal forms of subjectivity that the logic of government via 
milieus comes into play.”84  
In Moiseev’s model of the negative government of the Earth system through the 
milieu of computer simulation the subjects who display a lack of what was deemed to be 
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adequate self-regulation are Soviet government officials. By applying policy sciences to the 
global biosphere, Moiseev sought to alleviate the risk of environmental authoritarianism. In 
his vision of the noosphere, a scientifically governed Earth system, control does not flow top-
down from the central government, but bottom-up, from internal, autonomous discussion 
among experts to the government decision makers. This can be understood as an attempt at 
liberalization without full democratization: Moiseev’s model of government as guidance does 
not consider wider public engagement, but is restricted to securing a form of interaction 
between scientists and policy makers.  
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the post-cybernetic governance through milieu can 
be important in those cases where strongly polarized political ideologies are at play and 
where political and administrative hierarchies are very strong. For example, mathematical 
language and computer modelling could enjoy a unique epistemological autonomy in the 
Soviet context of political censorship. Whereas Soviet literary and policy discourses were 
tightly controlled to communicate positive images of the Soviet future and technoscientific 
progress, paying explicit dues to the primacy of the Party in decision making, the modelling 
of the global Earth system represented innovative and critical thought beyond official 
planning. The intellectual mission of global modelling was to enhance awareness of the limits 
to human knowledge and control, socializing policy makers to accept uncertainty as an 
inevitable condition. Here Earth system modeling formed a socio-technical milieu where 
scientists could not be separated from the results crunched out by the computer: the 
interpretation of modelling results was not accessible to a non-specialist, furthermore, tacit 
knowledge of how a particular mainframe computer worked was necessary to understand and 
evaluate the results. As global modelers held the monopoly of the production and 
interpretation of data about the past, current and future state of the global biosphere, they 
broke down the centralist structure of Party decision-making. Furthermore, global modeling 
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was expected to change the conceptual apparatus of what it means to govern by habituating 
policy-makers into working without the notion of purposive control of individuals and 
societies, at least at the global level. 
In this way, by developing a policy science for Earth system governance, Moiseev 
effectively contributed a building block for a new governmental milieu in the late Soviet 
Union. The political effect of this theory was “a new set of natural and social givens,” where 
natural givens were the planetary boundaries, established with the help of computer-based 
modelling of global geophysical processes. The planetary boundaries as natural givens were 
only made possible by the invention of new social givens, transnational scientific networks 
that cut across the Iron Curtain and that were crucially important for the production and 
exchange of data describing the Earth system. Moiseev’s extension of policy science to the 
global biosphere was not only an original intellectual experiment, but also an effort to 
intellectually transform existing Soviet policy practices, both institutionally and socially in 
the 1970s-1980s.
85
  
 
Conclusion 
Just like the pioneers of cybernetics in the 1940s, many Earth system scientists created their 
own theories of sociopolitical governance as they were searching for new models of 
engagement with policy making. As Brian Wynne has repeatedly argued, climate science 
emerged not so much as a truth machine, but reality-based social and policy heuristics, “an 
organising basis for a broader coalition of motivations, meanings, and social, ethical and 
political concerns.”86 The most recent debates among Earth system scientists themselves 
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reveal a continued search for new governmental epistemologies and practices that could 
bridge the intellectual and political gap between scientific expertise and government.
87
 It is in 
this context that this article proposed viewing the Soviet case of Earth system governance as 
an instructive lesson in the politics of ideas at the changing interface between science and 
global governance. 
This article has outlined Moiseev’s extension of Vernadskii’s ideas about the 
biosphere and noosphere to global governance, which resulted in the articulation of a liberal, 
negative, bottom-up mode of government through milieu. While in the West Teilhard de 
Chardin’s noosphere theory remained mainly a philosophical explanation of the relationship 
between mankind and the Earth,
88
 in the Soviet Union Vernadskii’s writing about the 
noosphere unexpectedly inspired innovative policy thinking. Its legacy is still felt in today’s 
Russia: through Moiseev’s publications in the 1980s-90s the noosphere spread as a model of 
a new, global governmental imagination, inspiring a diverse range of applications.
89
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Intellectually, the post-cybernetic notion of control as guidance undermined several 
components of the very institutional identity of the Soviet system: centralized administration 
and branch-specific goal-setting, the belief in linear control and, ultimately, the utopia of a 
bright, predictable future. This argumentation was made possible by the legitimacy that 
Soviet global modelers enjoyed, having contributed to the nuclear winter forecast; but it was 
also related to the political agenda of Gorbachev’s perestroika. Most importantly, it was the 
global dimension of the complex Earth system which served as a proxy for articulation of 
these innovative ideas. For Moiseev, to govern in the age of the noosphere was to create a 
globally integrated governmentality, based on new institutions, but also on new intellectual 
models of control, able to make sense of complexity, remaining reflexive over the contingent 
co-evolution of mankind and planet Earth.  
 In this respect, Moiseev’s theory of governance through guidance entailed an 
epistemological revolution in the context of Soviet modernization, where scientific expertise 
was traditionally allocated the role of loyal service to political leaders. Governmental use of 
milieu to guide societal practices posited the importance of carefully orchestrated efforts of 
international scientists. In the Soviet Union, one of the first such milieus was the Gaia 
modelling system designed at the Computer Center in Moscow, which was used to simulate 
the environmental effects of nuclear war, acidification of water, soil and forests and the 
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impact of carbon dioxide on climate change. This epistemological infrastructure was 
mobilized by scientists to lobby for different policies, ranging from nuclear disarmament to 
reduction of pollution and resource use. The global biosphere, materialized through computer 
systems, became a medium to govern the governor, the Party and industrial elites, an 
instrument of bottom-up activity. 
 Many of the conceptual principles enshrined in Moiseev’s framework of governance 
through guidance of the 1980s remain relevant in the second decade of the third millennium, 
as world climate scientists continue trying to get to grips with issues of a similar character. 
The idea of prohibitive regulation found its implementation in the setting of “planetary 
boundaries,” first approved by the international climate change scientists collective in 2009.90 
The search for the “institutes of agreement” is continued, most visibly in the team led by 
Frank Bierman, seeking to develop a viable model of international environmental 
governance. The epistemological project of inquiring into the organizational forms of the 
coevolution of the social, living and non-living matter is pursued in the STS field. While 
different conceptual approaches to the governance of complexity are tested by resilience 
scholars, it should not be forgotten that much of the vocabulary of resilience theory is derived 
from Cold War policy sciences. This is particularly important, because the bridging of Earth 
system sciences, the policy sciences and actual governmental practice remains a great 
challenge. Taken seriously, Moiseev’s point that the cybernetic notion of purposive 
governance is fundamentally unsuitable for large scale and long term aspects of Earth system 
governance could open up new avenues for re-conceptualizing government and control at the 
pragmatic level.  
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 The last, but not least important lesson that can be learned from the Soviet experience 
is that the history of the policy sciences can reveal the points where intellectual frameworks 
and social networks emerge and get disrupted. In the Soviet context of centralized planning 
and ideological control, Earth system policy science had an unexpected liberalizing effect. 
This is worth reflecting on. Instead of demonizing the policy sciences as tools of authoritarian 
technocrats and neoliberals, scholars should re-engage in dialogue with policy science about 
the knowability and governability of the increasingly complex planetary system, perhaps 
even keeping the concept of the noosphere as a critical lens. One way of engaging would be 
an explicit discussion of the implications that the computer-based modelling of the Earth 
system can have as a milieu for liberal governmentality. This computer-mediated milieu 
might contribute as a governmental tool, recasting our understanding of uncertainty and 
indeterminacy not as failures of scientific expertise and control, but as necessary components 
of politics and governance, components that manifest the strength, not weakness of scientific 
understanding.
91
 The story of Moiseev shows that this task is even more important in non-
democratic regimes, for it could be a stepping stone for a more liberal governmental 
imagination.  
 
* This work was supported by the European Research Council under an ERC Grant 283706 
awarded to the project A Political History of the Future: Knowledge Production and Future 
Governance 1945-2010 (Futurepol), PI Prof Jenny Andersson, the Paris Institute of Political 
Studies (Sciences Po), France, 2012-2015. I thank the four anonymous reviewers and the 
editors of MIH for their constructive and helpful comments and I am particularly grateful to 
                                                          
91 Helga Nowotny, The Cunning of Uncertainty (Oxford, 2015). 
46 
 
Paul Warde, Jonathan Oldfield and Francis Dodsworth for their generous feedback at various 
stages of this work. 
 
